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Scapegoat for the Trade Deficit: Does
EEC Antitrust Treatment of Joint
Ventures Place the United States at a
Competitive Disadvantage?
By DANA W. HAYTER*
Member of the Class of 1993
I. INTRODUCTION
Some political figures and economists portray the United States an-
titrust laws as contributors to the nation's economic decline.' While this
assertion is hotly contested by others,2 pro-business commentators on
both sides of the Atlantic will often cite the antitrust policy of their for-
eign counterparts as an example to be followed.3 Is this just a case of the
"grass is always greener," or do Europeans have something that Ameri-
cans do not? If so, should the European practice be emulated? This
Note addresses these questions.
* B.S.M.E., University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, 1986; Candidate, M.A., Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1993.
This Note is dedicated to the memory of my father. Special thanks to Professor Louis B.
Schwartz for his encouragement and comments on an earlier version of this Note, and to
Stephanie Cooper of the editorial staff for her helpful assistance.
1. Steven Greenhouse, What Clinton and Tsongas Want to Do With the Economy, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1992, § 4, at 2 (stating that Presidential candidate Paul Tsongas agrees with
Lester Thurow, economist and Dean of M..T.'s Sloan School of Management, who wants to
ease the antitrust laws); Adam Smith, Don't Bet on Us, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1992, § 7, at 3
(outlining and critiquing Thurow's thoughts); Lester Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1980, § 3, at 2.
2. Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, Letter, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1980, § 3, at 2; Walter
Adams & James W. Brock, Giantism Doesn't Equal Competitiveness, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27,
1987, at A19.
3. For example, arguing for loosened treatment of joint ventures, an American will point
to the European Community's relaxed attitude toward production joint ventures. See, e.g.,
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Acceptable Cooperation Among Competitors in the Face of
Growing International Competition, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 529, 549-50 n.67 (1989). A European
will observe that under United States antitrust law the difficult distinction between "concentra-
tive" and "cooperative" joint ventures does not exist. See, eg., Horst Satzky, New EECAnti-
trust Regime for Joint Ventures, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW. 518, 520 (1990).
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The American antitrust literature on the subject of joint ventures4
reflects a growing preoccupation with the European example. Many
commentators urge relaxation and clarification of American antitrust re-
straints on competitors who wish to pursue joint ventures. 5 These schol-
ars often support their arguments with brief, even perfunctory, references
to European antitrust law.6
Just as Europeans may overstate the case arguing for U.S. models,
7
American commentators tend to overlook aspects of European law that
many Americans would find overly constraining. For example, while
urging a treatment of joint ventures even more lenient than that of the
Europeans, one proposal to change United States law8 fails to recognize
that "one of the difficulties with exemption of [joint ventures from the
European Community's antitrust law] under Art[icle] 85(3) of the Treaty
of Rome is that the duration of any exemption is for a limited time only
and that the exemption may have certain conditions or obligations at-
tached to it."9 Indeed, some of the restraints and restrictions imposed on
joint ventures seeking shelter from antitrust liability in Europe would
undoubtedly strike American entrepreneurs as extreme government
intrusion.10
This Note will examine the European antitrust law applicable to
joint ventures, comparing it with the current United States law and with
a proposal for reform put forth by Professors Jorde and Teece of the
4. A joint venture is an enterprise or firm set up by two othe. firms to produce some
output or product. The parent firms cooperate in the production of the joint venture's output,
thus eliminating competition between the parents in the output market. Joint ventures differ
from mergers in that they do not combine the two firms' efforts in adl areas, but only in the
specific area of the joint venture. An example of a joint venture for production is the auto
assembly plant in Fremont, California, which is jointly held by General Motors and Toyota.
GM and Toyota cooperate only in producing the output of that plant, and not generally in the
production of all their goods.
5. See, eg., Jorde & Teece, supra note 3; Alvin F. Lindsay III, Tuning in to HDTVd Can
Production Joint Ventures Improve America's High-Tech Picture?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159,
1200 (1990).
6. See, eg., Jorde & Teece, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Valentine Korah, Critical Comments on the Commission's Recent Decisions
Exempting Joint Ventures to Exploit Research and Development that Needs Further Develop-
ment, 12 EUR. L. Rv. 18, 29-32 (1987) (urging a Sherman Act "rule of reason" approach to
EC antitrust law that allows a result which would probably be illegal price discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act).
8. Jorde & Teece, supra note 3.
9. Satzky, supra note 3, at 519. On the exemption mechanism, lice TREATY ESTABLISH-
ING EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION [EEC TREATY] art. 85(3), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3
(1958) and infra notes 45-56, 80-120 and accompanying text.
10. For examples of government supervision and control of excmpted joint ventures in
Europe, see infra notes 50, 88-93 and accompanying text.
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University of California at Berkeley." The Note will contend that there
is scant support for the Jorde and Teece argument that European treat-
ment of joint ventures creates a competitive need to profoundly diminish
the antitrust restraints on joint ventures in the United States. Their pro-
posal fails to adequately explore the complexities of the European Eco-
nomic Community's (EEC) antitrust exemption procedures. Most of
what the European business sector can do is also permissible in the
United States, but the governmental controls needed to police the few
impermissible ventures would be quite repugnant to most U.S. busi-
nesses. Failure to implement such government regulation in conjunction
with this proposed reform, however, would invite a wealth transfer from
consumers and legitimate antitrust plaintiffs to joint ventures. The Jorde
and Teece proposal would make it almost impossible to challenge truly
anticompetitive joint ventures, creating an incentive to monopolize that
would result in the waste of precious productive resources.' 2 The Note
will argue that if the U.S. really wants to "meet the competition" from
Europe by matching its antitrust treatment of joint ventures, many
Americans will have to revise their attitudes toward the government's
role in the economy and in industrial policy. Finally, the Note concludes
that antitrust regulation in a global economy must contain mechanisms
for preventing monopolization while simultaneously encouraging effi-
cient and beneficial cooperation. With some minor changes in U.S. law,
this balance can be optimized.
II. SOURCES AND ROLES OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST
LAW
The EEC Treaty contains antitrust provisions enforceable by the in-
11. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH
TECH L.J. 1 (1989).
12. Excessive market power (monopolization) results in at least two kinds of costs to soci-
ety: monopoly rent and "deadweight" social welfare loss. Monopoly rent is the extra money
that consumers pay to a monopolist for his restricted output. (As supply decreases the price
must go up, given constant demand. The monopolist's profit maximizing production rate will
always be lower than the optimal rate in a competitive market). Deadweight social welfare
loss is the cost to society that results when those consumers who are unable to pay the extra
monopoly rent for a product (but who could pay the lower price that would result from a
competitive market for the product), switch to alternatives that do not do the job as well or as
cheaply. For instance, unwilling to pay the monopoly price for a microwave oven, a consumer
might opt for a more expensive convection oven or a less useful toaster oven, even though the
consumer would happily pay a competitive price for a microwave oven. See generally ERNEsr
GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 63-74 (3d ed. 1986); F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 17-18, 459-71
(2d ed. 1980).
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stitutions13 of the treaty.1 4 These provisions, and the institutional acts to
enforce them, have the force of law in the member states. 15 Article 85 of
the Treaty is roughly analogous to the first section of1 the United States'
Sherman Act,16 in that it prohibits cooperation between competitors
which restrains trade or "distorts competition." 17 Article 86, roughly
13. The institutions include the Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Court
of Justice. For the structure of the European Community and the roles of and relationship
between its institutions, see T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW (2nd ed. 1988). In brief, and in the context of antitrust enforcement, the Council has
delegated much of its treaty-based antitrust enforcement power to the Commission, which
makes the day-to-day enforcement decisions on both a case by case basis and by promulgating
regulations. See infra text accompanying notes 25-35.
14. EEC TREATY arts. 85-94.
15. The Court of Justice explained it thus:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its
own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral
part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to
apply.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having... powers stemming
from a limitation of sovereignty, or a transfer of powers from the States to the Com-
munity, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and
themselves.
DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 29 (2d ed.
1987) (quoting Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593).
The relationship between national and Community competition law is summarized by
Bellamy and Child as follows:
(i) national competition laws must be administered in conformity with Community
law;
(ii) the prohibition of an agreement under Community law will prevail over any au-
thorization granted under national law;
(iii) matters which may involve an infringement of the Treaty may be investigated
under national law by the national authorities notwithstanding a pending investiga-
tion by the Commission;
(iv) the national authorities should take appropriate action to avoid the risk of paral-
lel investigations yielding conflicting results;
(v) if the Commission has decided to take no action, there is no objection to the
national authorities applying national law;
(vi) it is an open question whether national law may strike down an agreement
which is exempted under Article 85(3).
CHRISTOPHER W. BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETI-
TION 40 (3rd ed. 1987) (citations omitted).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Section 1 prohibits agreements in restraint of trade. For an analysis
of the treatment of joint ventures under the Sherman Act, see infra text accompanying notes
127-55.
17. EEC TREATY art. 85. The Article reads:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which:
[Vol. 16
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analogous to section 2 of the Sherman Act, prohibits structural monopo-
lies that "abuse ... [their] dominant position.""8
Article 85, however, differs from the Sherman Act in that it offers an
exemption mechanism in its third paragraph, Article 85(3).' 9 This para-
graph supplies a basis for exempting certain types of agreements that
improve several broad categories of efficiency,20 provided that a fair
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promot-
ing technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensa-
ble to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question.
18. EEC TREATY art. 86. The article reads:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the com-
mon market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse
may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other par-
ties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
19. See supra note 17.
20. The term "efficiency" in this context refers simply to the ratio of input to output. It is
the amount of utility required to make one unit of production. It could be expressed in dollars
per car at an automotive assembly plant, or pounds of grain per gallon of milk at a dairy. The
main benefit claimed for joint ventures is that they enable small firms to cooperate and match
the economies of scale enjoyed by larger competitors. The main danger of joint ventures is
that by turning two competitors into one firm, they can eliminate the competition necessary to
19931
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share of that efficiency is passed on to consumers. 21 It is this Treaty
provision which provides the basis of the EC's treatment of joint
ventures.
Article 87 of the Treaty gives the Council the "duty to adopt appro-
priate Regulations or Directives to give effect to the principles set out in
Articles 85 and 86. "122 Regulations are Community legislation, 2a roughly
analogous to Congressional statutes. They "have general application[,
are] binding in [their] entirety, and [are] directly applicable in all Mem-
ber States."'24
Acting pursuant to its Article 87 responsibility, the Council adopted
Regulation 17,25 the "principal Regulation providing for the administra-
tion and enforcement of Articles 85 and 86" by the Commission and the
Court of Justice.26 Regulation 17 sets up the procedural framework for
European antitrust, or competition, law. Under this framework, the
Commission is the primary Community-wide enforcement body of com-
petition law.27 It is subject to review by the Court of Justice,28 and has
broad powers to investigate agreements, decisions, and practices by
firms,29 as well as to enforce the law by threat of fines.30 The Commis-
sion may also make and publish decisions as to the lawfulness of firms'
acts31 and grant exemptions to the law pursuant to Article 85(3) of the
Treaty.32 These "individual" exemptions may be subject to conditions
and are only valid for a fixed period of time.
33
In addition to the "individual" exemptions under Article 85(3),
Council Regulation 2821/71 gives the Commission power to grant pro-
spective Article 85(3) "block exemptions" to certain categories of agree-
ensure that the lower costs garnered from that greater efficiency are passed on to the consum-
ers of the joint venture's output.
21. EEC TREATY art. 85(3).
22. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 25.
23. WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 38.
24. Id. (quoting EEC TREATY art. 189).
25. Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 J.O. 13/204 O.J. 1959-62, 87.
26. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 25.
27. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 25, art. 3.
28. Id. art. 17.
29. Id. art. 14.
30. Id. art. 15.
31. Id. art. 3.
32. Id. art. 6. On the exemption mechanism, see EEC TREATY art. 85(3) and infra notes
45-120 and accompanying text.
33. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 25, art. 8; WYATr & DASHWOOD supra note
15, at 437.
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ments without review.34 The premise behind this approach is that as the
Commission gains experience with certain types of agreements, it can
predetermine that some joint ventures are unlikely to threaten
competition.35
I. THE APPLICATION OF EEC COMPETITION LAW
TO JOINT VENTURES
A. Concentrative versus Cooperative Joint Ventures
Joint ventures in the small category labeled "concentrative" are ana-
lyzed as mergers under Regulation 4064/8936 and thereby taken out of
the scope of Article 85. This category is very limited, and would not
include, for instance, the automotive production joint venture outlined
supra in note 4. The paradigmatic "concentrative," or merger-like, joint
venture would be an independent and autonomous firm, set up by its
parent companies as shareholders, but operating in a field unrelated
either horizontally or vertically to the parent companies' fields.38
Excluded from the definition of "concentrative" is a venture which
either:
(a) Supplies output exclusively to its parents or "meets its own needs"
exclusively from them;39 or
(b) "[R]emains substantially dependent on its parents for the mainte-
nance and development of its business," even though the majority of its
transactions are with third parties;40 or
(c) has as its object or foreseeable effect the coordination of competi-
34. Council Regulation 2821/71 on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Catego-
ries of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices, 1971 J.0. (L 285) 46.
35. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 130.
36. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 1989 0.1. (L 395) 1.
37. Id.
38. See Commission Notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations under
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 1990 O.L (C 203) 10 [hereinafter Commission Notice 4064]; Satzky,
supra note 3. A "horizontal" relationship between firms is that of competition in the same
market. For example, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation are horizontal
competitors in the manufacture and sale of automobiles. A "vertical" relationship between
firms is that of one firm supplying an input to another. For example, if Alcoa, the aluminum
manufacturer, were to supply Ford with metal for its cars, Alcoa and Ford would be in a
vertical relationship, just as Ford and its dealers are in a vertical relationship. Two firms can
be both horizontal competitors and vertically related. For instance, Ford buys engines and
other components for some of its cars from Mazda, and competes with Mazda in the manufac-
ture and sale of cars generally.
39. Commission Notice 4064, supra note 38, art. 16.
40. Id.
19931
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tive behavior between the parents or between any parent and the joint
venture.41
A European firm demonstrating any of the above three features
would be treated as "cooperative" (as opposed to "concentrative" or
merger-like), and would thus be subject to Article 85.42 This is signifi-
cant because the rules governing cooperation between competitors under
Article 85 are much more stringent than the rules governing mergers
under Regulation 4064/89.41 The U.S. practice, by contrast, applies
merger standards to joint ventures. 44
B. Joint Ventures Under Article 85
The majority of "cooperative" joint ventures violate Article 85(1),
which applies to cooperation between competitors.4 : In practice, most
joint ventures are agreements between firms that are at least potential
competitors, if not actual competitors in the same markets. The Com-
mission seems to interpret the law so that "as many joint ventures as
possible" violate Article 85(1) and must then be assessed under Article
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome.46 By interpreting agreements to violate
Article 85(1), the Commission ensures control of as many joint ventures
as possible, because only the Commission may grant an exemption under
Article 85(3). 4 7 The result of such interpretation, combined with the lim-
ited temporal nature of exemptions48 and the conditions and obliga-
tions49 often imposed by the Commission, 0 is that firms that wish to
create a joint venture must often subject themselves to a substantial
amount of government intervention:
41. Id. art. 20.
42. Satzky, supra note 3, at 519.
43. Id.
44. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.42 (1988), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 113,109
(Mar. 7, 1989). For a discussion of how to evaluate the competitive effects ofjoint ventures as
compared with mergers, see infra note 181 and the materials cited therein.
The point of comparing the merger standards with the joint venture standards in each
jurisdiction is that the Europeans view joint ventures with considerably more circumspection
than mergers, perhaps because they recognize that the competitive effects of a joint venture can
be harder to evaluate than those of mergers. For an example of those complex competitive
effects, see the discussion of WANO Schwartzpulver infra text accompanying notes 98-121.
45. EEC TREATY art. 85.
46. Satzky, supra note 3, at 520.
47. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 367.
48. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 25, art. 8.
49. Id.
50. For examples of such impositions, see infra text accompanying notes 88-93.
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[T]his enables the Commission to keep control: it can impose condi-
tions on the parties, but at the cost of delay and, when it insists on
amendments being made to the agreement, of enabling any party
whose consent is required for the change to renegotiate agreements
after their relative bargaining power has altered. 1
Joint ventures are treated in one of three ways under Article 85.
They may be exempt from Art. 85(1) under one of the block exemptions
promulgated by Commission Regulation, with its underlying framework
of Article 85(3);52 exempt under the individual exemption provision of
Article 85(3);13 or illegal because they do not qualify for exemption.54
These possibilities will be examined in turn. Because almost any joint
venture comes under Article 85,11 the standard for evaluating joint ven-
tures is that of Article 85(3), regardless of whether an individual or block
exemption is sought. For example, even if a joint venture is permitted
under a block exemption, the reason behind the exemption is that this
type of joint ventures has been found to meet the stringent requirements
of Article 85(3).
Under Article 85(3), a joint venture that otherwise violates Article
85(1) will be exempted from the Article 85(1) prohibition if the joint
venture meets four conditions:
(a) it "contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress" and
(b) it allows "consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit" and
(c) it "does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;" and
(d) it does not "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect [to] a substantial part of the products in
question."
56
51. Korah, supra note 7, at 19.
52. See Council Regulation 2821/71, supra note 34.
53. See supra note 17.
54. For example, see Commission Decision in re WANO Schwartzpulver, 1978 OJ. (L
322) 26.
55. This is assuming the agreement is between "competitors" or "potential competitors,"
which are categories of firms the Commission interprets very broadly. BELLAMY & CHILD,
supra note 15, at 225. The only thing that would save a joint venture agreement from coming
under Article 85(1) would be the de minimis rule. See Commission Notice of 3rd September
1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1986 OJ. (C 231) 2. Generally, agreements be-
tween competitors who: (1) share less than five percent of the relevant market, and (2) share a
maximum total turnover of 200 million ECU, will not come under Article 85(1). Thus, large
firms with even minuscule shares of the relevant market would still come under Article 85(1).
BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 123-24.
56. EEC TREATY art. 85.
19931
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C. Exemptions for Joint Ventures Under Article 85
There are two mechanisms for utilizing the exemption provision of
Article 85(3): individual exemptions and block exemptions. The individ-
ual exemption is granted for the particular agreement under considera-
tion after notification to and investigation by the Commission. Such
individual exemptions will almost always impose significant terms, con-
ditions, and temporal limitations.57 This method is deemed "ponderous
and slow""8 by the firms that use it, and consequently, the number of
joint ventures individually exempted is small.59 The individual exemp-
tion will be treated at greater length infra.6° It is sufficient for present
purposes to note that most joint ventures achieving exemption do so
under the "block exemption" category.
1. Block Exemptions
The Commission has made "increasing use of its power to grant
block exemptions by regulation."61 As it gained experience with the
procompetitive and anticompetitive attributes of different types of indi-
vidual exemptions, the Commission promulgated regulations granting
block exemptions for those types of joint ventures it found posed little
danger of impairing competition in the Community.62
One feature all the block exemption regulations have in common is
market share limits.63 These limits ensure that the members of the joint
venture will not collectively hold such a large percentage of the output
product market that they could raise market prices or restrict total
output.
All of the block exemption regulations take a standard approach:
The category of agreements to which the regulation applies is identified
in broad terms and lists are then give[n] of specific obligations which
may or may not be included without forfeiting the benefit of the block
exemption. These are sometimes referred to as, respectively, the
"white" and "black" lists. Provision will be made for the withdrawal
57. BELLAMY AND CHILD, supra note 15, at 130.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 81-192.
61. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 130.
62. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 418/85 on the application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to categories of research and development agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5.
63. See, e-g., Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 62, art. 3 (20% of the products
"considered by users to be equivalent" to the joint venture's products) and art. 7 (same); Com-
mission Regulation 417/85, on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of
Specialization Agreements, art. 3 (same) 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1.
[Vol, 16
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of the exemption by the Commission if it finds that, despite compliance
with the regulation, an agreement has certain effects that do not satisfy
the criteria in Article 85(3). 64
The result of this approach is that, in practice, the block exemption
regulations structure the substance of joint venture agreements in all
cases where any increased joint venture efficiency garnered by diverging
from the approved "white list" contract terms is outweighed by the in-
creased cost of attempting to obtain an individual exemption.65 Further,
even joint venture agreements which might fall under a block exemption,
such as those for research and development (R&D), must not contain
certain provisions which have been found to create anticompetitive dan-
gers, e.g., the "black list" terms. For example, the regulation covering
joint ventures for R&D prohibits agreements that place restraints on out-
put.66 Thus, if parties wishing to create a joint venture for R&D want to
restrict the joint venture's output, they will only opt to go through the
long and expensive process of obtaining an individual exemption if they
believe that the cost of obtaining the individual exemption will be less
than what they will realize through the output restrictions. Additionally,
in order to obtain the individual exemption, the parties must ultimately
prove that the output restrictions meet the pro-competitive requirements
of Article 85(3).
The block exemption regulations applicable to joint ventures also
offer an "opposition procedure."'67 This is a mechanism for providing
quick individual exemptions to joint venture agreements for which block
exemptions exist (such as for R&D), but which contain terms that are
neither "white" nor "black." These "grey list" joint venture agreements
are not allowed automatic block exemptions. Because the "grey list"
joint ventures do not contain "black" list terms, they do not necessarily
require the long individual exemption procedure, either. As long as the
parties to a "grey list" joint venture meet the combined market share
limits of the regulations,68 they may use the "opposition procedure,"
whereby the joint venture agreement is publicly "notified to the Commis-
sion[,] which is given a period (normally six months)[,J to express its
64. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 387-88.
65. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 130; WYATt & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at
387.
66. Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 62, art. 6(c).
67. WYATt & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 388.
68. See ag., Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 62, art. 3, 7; Commission Regu-
lation 417/85, on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialization
Agreements, art. 4, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1. See also supra note 63 and infra note 80.
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opposition. ' 69 If the Commission fails to object, the agreement has a
block exemption,70 even though the original agreement was not covered
by the "white list" portion of the regulation.71
Many types of joint venture agreements that are allowed block ex-
emptions have fixed time limits, 72 and all are limited by the thirteen year
validity of the regulations.73 Additionally, any exemption from Art.
85(1) is under the threat of revocation (which suggests reformation of the
joint venture agreement as a less drastic alternative), should the Commis-
sion decide that the agreement fails to meet the requirements of Art.
85(3) in practice.74
The two block exemption regulations most applicable to joint ven-
tures for research or production are: Commission Regulation 417/85"'
governing "specialization agreements," which aim to achieve economies
of scale by allowing firms to manufacture only some components of a
product assembled by both, and to buy the remaining components
needed for manufacture exclusively from the other party; and Commis-
sion Regulation 418/8576 governing research and development of joint
ventures, including some that jointly exploit the results of the research.
There are no block exemptions aimed explicitly at joint ventures for
production, although production joint ventures may benefit from the op-
position procedures of either 417/85 or 418/85, or both.77 In addition,
joint marketing agreements are disfavored and are almost per se disal-
lowed.78 The Commission prefers to see competition in the distribution
and marketing of goods, even if they are made in the same plant. Joint
marketing agreements can be exempted only when absolutely inseparable
from other allowed joint activities.79
In summary, firms who wish to set up a joint venture may find regu-
lations offering a block exemption very attractive because the block ex-
69. WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 388.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 62, art. 3 (joint exploitation of
joint research results: 5 years from first sale of product) and art. 4 (active sale market division:
5 year maximum, providing no impediment to passive sales).
73. Council Regulation 417/85, supra note 63, par. 8; Council Regulation 418/85, supra
note 62, par. 17.
74. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 388; BELLAMY AND CHILD, supra note 15,
at 155-57.
75. Supra note 63.
76. Supra note 62.
77. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 228.
78. Id. at 185-89, 231.
79. Id.
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emptions allow certainty and ease of application. An agreement that
meets the market share/turnover limitations and has only "white list"
terms is legal, subject to the investigative and retroactive revocation pow-
ers of the Commission.8 0 An agreement that contains restrictive terms
not on either the "white" or "black" lists but which meets the market
share limit required to invoke the opposition procedure (twenty percent
or less of the relevant market), may be notified to the Commission, and if
not opposed, may receive legal status in six months-much more quickly
than an individual exemption under Art. 85(3).
2. Individual Exemptions
Firms who wish to set up a joint venture by an agreement which
includes "black list" terms, or whose joint market share exceeds twenty
percent of the relevant market, must endure the individual exemption
process under Article 85(3). This process can take up to three years,
perhaps longer,"1 because the Commission "may want to discuss the
public interest at some length with the parties," especially if it has little
experience with the particular party's industry.82 Additionally, if the
Commission deems it necessary, it will require "the parties to alter not
only the restrictive provisions, but also the structure of the [joint venture
itself]." ' 83
There are three especially notable aspects of the Commission's exe-
cution of its individual exemption power. One is that the exemptions are
always temporary. 4 The Commission has "observed that competition
itself is [generally] the best guarantee of regular supply on the best
terms."8 5 An exemption is viewed as a temporary means to stimulate
competition or to speed up market processes, such as re-allocation of
productive resources tied up in extra capacity.86 The Commission plays
an active governmental role in the economy. Indeed, "many exemptions
will produce permanent changes in the structure of the market
concerned."87
80. The market share limit is 20% of the relevant market for joint ventures for R & D and
subsequent exploitation. Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 62, art. 3. For speciali-
zation agreements there is a market share limit of 20% of the relevant market, in addition to a
500 million ECU turnover limit. Commission Regulation 417/85, supra note 63, art. 3.
81. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 135.
82. Korah, supra note 7, at 21 n.12.
83. Id. at 37.
84. BELLAMY AND CHILD, supra note 15, at 155-56.
85. Id at 143.
86. Id.
87. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 382.
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A second remarkable aspect of the Commission's implementation of
individual exemptions is that the Commission has, and frequently uses,
the power to attach conditions and stipulations to joint venture agree-
ments."8 Additionally, the Commission will actively "supervise the oper-
ation of the agreement," and ensure that effective competition is
maintained in the Common Market.89 One condition of the past re-
quired parties to submit "periodic and detailed reports relating to the
operation of the agreement."9 The Commission watches closely for
"any cases of refusals to supply," '91 and has required that customers of
an exempted firm be notified of the joint venture agreement. 92 Addition-
ally, the Commission has "required minutes to be supplied." 93 Thus, an
exemption requires future supervision and regulation in the public inter-
est. After the exemption expires, the Commission retains a wealth of
confidential information that it may use to scrutinize the future market
behavior of the parties.
The third notable aspect of the individual exemption process is that
"[i]n practice, the Commission seeks to ensure that the advantages of the
agreement will enure to consumers and not merely to the parties them-
selves." 94 This requirement is usually met by a factual9 showing by the
parties of a "reasonable probability" that the "benefits of the agreements
will be passed on because of the pressure of competition." 96 Even after a
successful showing, however, the exemption may be revoked if the Com-
mission finds that this requirement is not met "in practice."97
D. The WANO Schwartzpulver Case
The grant of an individual exemption is not guaranteed for every
joint venture. If an agreement does not meet the requirements of Article
83(3), exemption will be refused. A good example of a refusal is WANO
88. Id. at 156-57.
89. Id. at 156.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 149.
95. Id. at 153. This approach of granting exemptions that are continually conditioned on
a factual showing of consumer benefit can be contrasted with an approach that would allow
permanent and prospective exemptions based on nothing more than classical economic theory.
See Judge Bork's approach, creating aperse rule of legality in Rothery Storage and Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), outlined infra text accompanying notes 140-
147.
96. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 149.
97. Id.
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Schwartzpulver, which involved a joint venture requested by WANO
Schwartzpulver (WANO) and ICI.98 The case illustrates that a joint ven-
ture is not always essential to achieving competitive economies of scale,
that large firms can use joint ventures to monopolize markets other than
the joint venture's product market, and that sorting out the real competi-
tive effects of a joint venture can require a substantial amount of
investigation.
Before entering into an agreement, ICI held a near monopoly in the
manufacture and sale of black powder in the United Kingdom. Black
powder is an explosive and an essential input to the manufacture of
safety fuse used for igniting various other explosives.99 WANO was the
black powder manufacturing subsidiary of WASAG, a German firm with
about half of Germany's black powder sales market." 0 WASAG also
manufactured safety fuse, and WASAG and ICI together made about
two-thirds of the Community's safety fuse."' 1 There were only three
other manufacturers of black powder in the Community, and this oligo-
polistic manufacturing market had "considerable" over-capacity. 02
Both WASAG, through its parent Bohlen, and ICI, through its subsidiar-
ies, were large competitors in the general field of explosives.10 3 Both had
set up extensive, highly regulated distribution systems to safely transport
and supply black powder in their home countries."10
Following a fire at its United Kingdom manufacturing plant, ICI
decided to phase out production of black powder. It agreed with
WASAG to acquire a one-half interest in WANO. t°5 The parties further
agreed to buy all their requirements of black powder from WANO, assign
all black powder know-how, patents, and good-will to WANO, and to
make "important decisions" for WANO at joint shareholders'
meetings.1 °6
After an extensive, three year investigation by the Commission, it
was determined that the joint venture would allow ICI to unfairly ex-
clude competition and raise prices."7 ICI was in possession of the only
98. Commission Decision in re WANO Schartzpulver, supra note 54.
99. Id. at I(4)(b)(ii).
100. Id. at I(4)(c), II(2)(a).
101. Id. at I(4)(c)(i), II(2)(d).
102. Id. at I(4)(d).
103. Id. at 1(2).
104. Id. at I(4)(a)(v), II(5)(e).
105. Id. at I(3)(b).
106. Id.
107. The agreement was signed October 14, 1975 and the Commission decision is dated
October 20, 1978. Id at I(b)(i).
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distribution system for black powder in the U.K., a 350,000 pound-ster-
ling entry barrier to competitive suppliers. After a fire, however, it no
longer had the transportation and production cost advantage of local,
wholly-owned manufacturing. The agreement would have allowed ICI
to continue to get its black powder at marginal cost by virtue of its profit
from WANO, and simultaneously exclude WANO's continental competi-
tors from its distribution network by virtue of an exclusive dealings con-
tract with WANO. In determining that Article 85(1) was violated, the
Commission found the following anticompetitive effects:
(1) foreclosure of ICI's demand from other black powder manufactur-
ers regardless of whether their prices were more favorable (and opera-
tions thus more efficient) than WANO's;
10 8
(2) higher prices for United Kingdom consumers;10 9
(3) probable impairment of competition in other common areas of
business, particularly in the area of safety fuse.
10
The nature of black powder as a necessary ingredient for safety fuse,
and the strength of the parties in both the black powder and safety fuse
markets was particularly troubling: "the parties would jointly control
the quantities and prices of any black powder... sold by the joint ven-
ture for safety fuse production [to] any third-party competitors.""'
The Commission took implicit notice of the market barrier effects of
ICI's entrenched distribution system when it made these findings. If the
Commission had looked solely to the overcapacity in the industry, it
would have simplistically concluded that any excess pricing by ICI
would have been met by its three competitors from overseas. The market
barriers, however, would have precluded this competition and left ICI
with a virtual monopoly in the United Kingdom.
ICI argued that it would have to buy from WANO regardless of
whether it owned part of the company because (1) WANO was the only
plant in the Community that could meet its specifications, and (2) buying
from other suppliers would raise security problems for military con-
tracts.1 2 However, the Commission's own investigation found that
WANO's competitors were willing and able to supply the needed grades
and quantities of black powder, and that one of them had in fact supplied
108. Id. at II(4)(d)(i). After ICI's cessation of manufacturing in the United Kingdom, all
supplies of black powder had similar transportation costs to the U.K. Market.
109. Id. at II(4)(b).
110. Id. at II(2)(d).
111. Id.
112. Id. at II(3)(a)(i), (ii).
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the United Kingdom's military with black powder.11 3
ICI claimed that even if the joint venture was found to violate Arti-
cle 85(1), it should get an individual exemption because "the pooled tech-
nology and resources of ICI and WASAG would enable" economies of
scale and the development of new processes. 1 4 The Commission refused
to grant an individual exemption. Contrary to Article 85(3), the agree-
ment would have allowed "the parties the possibility of eliminating com-
petition" in a substantial part of the product market "by precluding sales
into the United Kingdom by suppliers other than WANO."' "5 Competi-
tion would have been further eliminated as the agreement shut "out all
possibilities of competition" between WANO and ICI for sales in the
United Kingdom.116
Additionally, the Commission found that the parties had not met
their burden of showing that the claimed economies of scale would in
fact exist. 17 Since these economies of scale, supposedly allowing lower
product cost and the development of new processes, were the only im-
provements claimed to meet Article 85(3)'s requirement of "promotion
of technical progress," the agreement failed on this ground as well."'
Finally, the Commission noted that even if the claimed efficiencies had
existed, the parties had not shown that "a fair share of" the benefits of
those efficiencies would get passed on to consumers.119 In its position of
monopoly manufacturer and distributor of black powder in the United
Kingdom, "ICI would be subject to negligible competitive pressure to
pass on... any savings made by increased efficiency." '
WANO provides a good illustration of some of the competitive dan-
gers joint ventures can pose. The larger size of a joint venture does not
necessarily make it more efficient than its competitors. In WANO, the
claimed economies of scale did not exist. Secondly, there are complex
dangers of collusion on secondary markets when two big players cooper-
ate in one sector of their businesses, especially when that sector is an
input for other sectors in which they operate. For example, the proposed
joint venture would have allowed WANO and ICI to control a large seg-
ment of the market for safety fuse by controlling a large part of the mar-
ket for its essential black powder input. Finally, WANO demonstrates
113. Id. at II(3)(b)(ii).
114. Id. at 111(2).
115. Id. at IHI(1).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 111(2).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 111(4).
120. Id.
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that adequately investigating these dangers can take a substantial amount
of time, especially if the investigating body has little or no experience
with the structure of a given industry, such as with the entry barriers
created by the regulated black powder distribution system. 121 Reliance
on simple indicators like the number of competitors and their capacities
will not always produce an accurate or efficient dete:rmination.
E. The Salient Points of the European Antitrust Regime
For competitors with small market shares (less than twenty percent
of the product market), joint ventures are easily accomplished subject to
the continuing oversight of the Commission. Small joint ventures are
provided a "safe harbor" within the block exemption regulations which
presume small joint ventures are legal and pro-competitive if they meet
the "white list" requirements. 122 In practice, as long as an agreement
does not have "black list" terms, a small market share joint venture will
probably receive approval through the opposition procedure. Nonethe-
less, the Commission recognizes that market share is not the sole deter-
minant of future competitive effects. Even a "white list" joint venture
may be terminated if its operation proves to be anticompetitive in prac-
tice. Further, because of the opposition procedure, "grey list" joint ven-
tures will not be approved if they have anticompetitive effects, even if
they have small market shares. The presumption that small market
share joint ventures are pro-competitive is not conclusive.
123
The Commission's approach to exemptions in general is empirical,
not theoretical. The public benefits of an exemption must be demon-
strated "in practice," not just prospectively. The Commission looks to
whether competition is in fact taking place, not whether it should be ac-
cording to classical economic theory. It insists on factual showings that
increases in efficiencies will be shared with the public in exchange for
individual exemptions, and looks to its previous experience in the case of
block exemptions. Both types of exemptions are subject to continual
Commission oversight. It is important to contrast this empirical ap-
121. This substantial time requirement can be contrasted with the 90 day time limit for
processing the U.S. exemptions advocated by Jorde and Teece. See infra note 167 and accom-
panying text.
122. Commission Regulation 417/85, supra note 63; Commission Regulation 418/85,
supra note 62. See also supra text accompanying notes 57-80 (discussing application of block
exemption regulations).
123. The non-conclusive nature of this presumption is significant because Jorde and Teece
portray Judge Bork's conclusive presumption (outlined supra note 95 and infra text accompa-
nying notes 140-147) as based in European experience, or at least as needed in the U.S. to
compete with the latitude allowed joint ventures under European antitrust law.
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proach with the increasingly theoretical nature of U.S. antitrust scholar-
ship.'24 Empirical studies of actual market behavior show that even joint
ventures with relatively small market shares can sometimes have an-
ticompetitive effects, despite the best predictions of classical economic
theory.
125
The Commission's approach to joint ventures indicates that the rele-
vant concern is not merely which joint ventures may yield increases in
allocative efficiency, as many U.S. commentators urge.1 26 Increases in
efficiency that are completely appropriated by the shareholders of the
joint venture partners are not permitted; some of the benefits must be
passed on to consumers. Joint ventures failing to give a fair share of their
benefits to the consumer may be terminated.
Exemptions under the European antitrust regime are temporary
tools used as part of an industrial plan, not permanent protection from
the antitrust laws available for every joint venture agreement, regardless
of the agreement's purpose or effect. The venture must prove, through
experience or factual showing, that it will contribute to technical pro-
gress. Large concentrations of economic power must demonstrate their
worth. When the technical progress is accomplished and the firms have
had time to recoup their investment, the exemption ends.
IV. TREATMENT OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Case Law
The Sherman Act is written in broad language: "Every contract...
in restraint of trade or commerce ... is ... illegal."' 27 Despite this
breadth of language, the Supreme Court quickly restricted the Act's ef-
124. See, e.g., Judge Bork's comment that the antitrust analysis of a joint venture might
"begin and end" with an examination of its market share in Rothery Storage and Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, 729 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and the Supreme Court's adoption of
Bork's position on predatory pricing in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). The Supreme Court, however, showed a renewed interest in
facts that support a defendant's claim that its activities cannot possibly be anticompetitive in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2081-89 (1992) (insist-
ing that Kodak's theories be in accord with actual market behavior as demonstrated by the
facts).
125. See generally Willard F. Mueller, The Sealy Restraint" Restriction on Free Riding or
Output?, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1255, 1257.
126. Compare, for example the approach outlined in Alden F. Abbott, Joint Production
Ventures: The Case for Antitrust Reform, 58 ANTrrRuST L J. 715, 719 (only joint ventures
which reduce welfare should be blocked).
127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.
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fect to prohibition of "unreasonable" restraints of trade. 128 An unrea-
sonable agreement is one which, upon examination, has "anticompetitive
evils" that outweigh its "procompetitive virtues." 129 "Horizontal" agree-
ments (those between competitors or potential competitors) have been
declared reasonable or unreasonable depending on the content of the
agreement, and perhaps the date of the decision.1 30 Certain horizontal
agreements are declared illegal per se because they are "so patently in-
consistent with a free competitive system that no considerations of rea-
sonableness" can justify them.13 1 Agreements between competitors to fix
prices, for instance, are per se illegal.
1 32
In Addyston Pipe and Steel,133 Judge (later President and then Chief
Justice) Taft laid out the basic division still used to distinguish between
horizontal agreements that are illegal per se and those that require the
more extensive rule of reason balancing: "[N]aked" price-fixing agree-
ments or market allocation agreements, i.e., agreements which can have
no other object or effect but to raise prices or restrict output, are per se
illegal, but "ancillary" restraints, i.e., those "incident to the main pur-
pose of a union [between competitors] to carry on a successful business
... useful to the community," are not, and are thus subject to the rule of
reason analysis. 134
128. United States v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
129. Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 19711).
130. In the anti-big business climate during and soon after the Great Depression, there was
a tendency in the United States Supreme Court to more rigidly enforce the antitrust laws. This
gave some the impression that the Court viewed all horizontal agreements as per se illegal.
Compare United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel, 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899) ("naked" price-fixing or market allocation agreements, i:e., agreements which
can have no other object or purpose but to raise prices or restrict output are per se illegal, but
"ancillary" restraints, ie., those "incident to the main purpose of a union [between competi-
tors] to carry on a successful business ..- useful to the community," such as partnership
agreements, are legal) with Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951) ("agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition
among themselves and others" cannot be justified "by labeling the project a 'joint venture' ")
and with United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (where only two dis-
senters thought that the creation of a joint production and sales company by two potential
competitors to penetrate a concentrated market violated the Sherman Act, and even the major-
ity could not say for sure that the Clayton Act had been violated), complaint dismissed on
remand United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D.Del. 1965) (Clayton
Act not violated).
131. Louis B. SCHWARTZ & JOHN J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNA-
TIVES 14 (5th ed. 1977).
132. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 330 (1982).
133. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
134. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Addyston Pipe and Steel, 85 F. at 280).
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The rule of reason, however, balances restraints on competition
against the pro-competitive effects of the restraint.13 It does not balance
restraints against asserted resultant public benefits generally. Thus, "the
rule of reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable." 136 The ancillary restraints in ques-
tion must, on balance, give rise to a more competitive marketplace.
Whether a joint venture's restraint of competition should be evalu-
ated under the rule of reason or as illegal per se is thus fairly certain.
While "naked" restraints cannot be dressed up "by labeling [them] a
'joint venture' -137 and are thus illegal per se, "ancillary restraints" inci-
dent to a socially useful purpose are subject to a rule of reason
analysis.
13
Exactly how to apply the rule of reason to a joint venture is some-
what less settled. Some commentators argue that there is an emerging
consensus in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that there is a "safe
harbor" built into the rule of reason for joint ventures with market shares
below twenty to twenty-five percent. 139 Jorde and Teece argue that
Judge Bork found a basis for this approach in Supreme Court decisions
when he wrote Rothery.140 Indeed, this seems to be Bork's approach. In
Rothery, Judge Bork first made a convincing case that theper se rule for
all horizontal restraints had been abandoned, assuming it ever existed.
141
Judge Bork then cited Northern Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co. 142 for the proposition that, absent a "'threshold showing'
that the [defendant] 'possesses market power or exclusive access to an
135. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)
(stating that the test is "whether the restraint imposed... promotes competition or whether it
... suppress[es] ... competition").
136. Id. at 696.
137. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
138. Rothery, 792 F.2d at 224 (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel, 85 F.
271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), afi'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)). See also United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), discussed supra note 130.
In United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the court held that all market
division agreements between competitors in a joint venture whether or not part of otherperse
violations, were illegal per se, but this approach has been clearly abandoned. See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (rule of reason applied);
NCAA v. University of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rule of reason applied because "horizontal
restraints... are essential if the product is to be available at all.").
139. Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30 JURIMmRICS J. 253,
260 (1990).
140. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation,
Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 45 n.112 (1989).
141. 792 F.2d at 215-16.
142. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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element essential to effective competition,'" the rule of reason will apply
instead of the per se rule.143 His next step, however, was to hold that no
restraints enacted by the defendant joint venture could violate the rule of
reason because the defendant held only six percent of the relevant mar-
ket.1" In fact, Bork commented that the "[a]nalysis might begin and
end with the observation that [the joint venture] command[s] between 5.1
and 6% of the relevant market."'
145
Judge Wald, while concurring in Rothery, nonetheless called Judge
Bork's second step into question. While agreeing with the application of
the rule of reason, she noted that there is "nothing in [the Supreme
Court's cases that] supports the panel's new per se rule of legality."'
146
She concurred because she thought that "the District Court correctly
undertook, in the traditional way, to 'carefully balance' the anticompeti-
tive evils of the challenged practice . . . against its pro-competitive
virtues."14 7
Judge Wald's approach is endorsed by the Supreme Court. In
NCAA v. University of Okla., the Court explicitly held that "as a matter
of law, absence of proof of market power does not justify" horizontal
restraints.148 Lack of market power may justify bypassing the per se rule
and using the rule of reason, but it does not automatically make any
restraint legal. Pro- and anticompetitive effects must still be balanced 
1 49
Jorde and Teece nonetheless think that Rothery and recent Supreme
Court cases can be read for the proposition that "under the rule of reason
analysis, plaintiffs must first establish that cooperating defendants pos-
sess substantial market power,"' 150 i.e. a "20-25% market share in a rele-
vant market,"' 5 1 to withstand a motion for summary judgement. t52 Both
NCAA v. University of Okla. and Indiana Federation of Dentists make it
clear that this is not the law. The rule of reason demands balancing of
143. Rothery, 792 F.2d at 229.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 217.
146. Id. at 231 n.1.
147. Id. at 230 (quoting Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
148. NCAA v. University of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984); See also FTC v. Indiana Fed-
eration of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
149. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's pronouncements, at least one other circuit
seems to have adopted an approach similar to Rothery. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City
Enterprises, 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Judge Easterbrook upholding a joint venture
without rule of reason balancing).
150. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 45-46.
151. Id.
152. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 45, 62 (describing their proposed prima facie anti-
trust case).
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the pro- and anticompetitive aspects of an agreement, regardless of mar-
ket power.
B. The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
For joint ventures conducting research and development, the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act of 1984153 (NCRA) provides limited
protection from liability under the federal and state antitrust laws. To
qualify for protection, joint ventures must register with the U.S. Attor-
ney General and the Federal Trade Commission within ninety days of
the joint venture's inception.
154
"A major reason for passing the NCRA was concern for the [inter-
national] 'competitiveness' of U.S. industry."'1 55 Fearful that high risk
research and development, critical to America's continued economic
strength, was stifled by the threat of antitrust liability, Congress re-wrote
the law applicable to competitors who agree to jointly perform this
research.
Among the benefits provided to registered joint ventures under the
statute is a limitation on the damages available to a plaintiff who prevails
in a civil antitrust suit against the joint venture. Normally, a plaintiff
may recover treble damages under the antitrust laws. 56 These treble
damage provisions are to encourage "private attorneys general" to help
enforce the antitrust laws.' 57 Under the NCRA, however, a plaintiff is
limited to actual damages when the defendant's liability "results from
conduct that is within the scope of' the description of the joint venture
contained in the registration. 5 ' Under either scheme, a prevailing plain-
tiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to damages, but a
losing NCRA plaintiff may be charged for the defendant's legal fees if
her claim is found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or
in bad faith."' 59 Additionally, the act explicitly requires joint ventures
for R&D to be evaluated under the rule of reason, as opposed to theper
se rule. 16°
153. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-4305 [hereinafter NCRA].
154. Id. § 4305(a).
155. Louis B. SCHWARTZ ET AL, FREE ENTERPRISE AND EcoNoMIC ORGANIZATION:
ANTrrRusr 157 (6th ed. Supp. 1991).
156. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 1991) (Clayton Act).
157. Richard W. Pogue, A Private Bar Outlook, I JUSTICE 44, 45 (Spring 1991).
158. NCRA § 4303(b).
159. Id. § 4304.
160. Id. § 4302.
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C. An Analysis of the Jorde and Teece Proposal for U.S. Reform
Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece propose legislation which
would augment the NCRA by introducing a procedu:re superficially simi-
lar to Europe's treatment of joint ventures, citing the need to "align U.S.
antitrust policy.., to antitrust policy in Europe." '161 In 1989, Congress-
man Rick Boucher (D-VA) and Tom Cambell (R-CA) introduced legisla-
tion based on this proposal.1 62 Examination of the procedure and
standards Jorde and Teece propose makes it clear that their proposal far
exceeds the protection that is available to European joint ventures. Their
proposal would make it virtually impossible for consumers or competi-
tors to challenge a wide range of horizontal agreements, despite their
claim that "[c]ooperative innovation arrangements [would] remain sub-
ject to the antitrust laws."1 63 Even non-certified joint ventures would
enjoy a "clarified" rule of reason analysis which would make a plaintiff's
task all but impossible.' 6
The Jorde and Teece proposal is unsupported by European practice.
Their proposal contains two elements: the exemption procedure, and the
"clarified" standards applicable to all horizontal restraints, regardless of
certification.
1 65
1. The Exemption Procedure
The Jorde and Teece proposal introduces a certification procedure
that would completely exempt certified joint ventures from all national
and state antitrust laws for seventeen years upon approval of the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. 66 The agency in
charge of the exemption procedure would have a maximum of ninety
days to approve or disapprove the exemption. 167 All exemptions, refus-
als to exempt, and revocations would require the concurrence of the Sec-
retary of Commerce.1 68 Administrative decisions would be subject to
judicial review, and would require support by substantial evidence.
169
161. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 2.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Id. at 88.
164. Id. at 88-93.
165. Id. at 61.
166. Id. at 73, 102.
167. Id. at 100-01.
168. Id. at 86, 96, 100, 103.
169. Id. at 106. The "substantial evidence" standard of review is the most deferential stan-
dard of review applied to factual determinations in U.S. law. Under the standard, any mean-
ingful evidence in the record below which supports the fact-finder's conclusion is enough to
uphold a finding. This is true even if the contrary evidence is overwhelming. As applied in
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No action taken by the reviewing agencies would be admissible in a pri-
vate lawsuit,' and "[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or attor-
ney's fees" could be recovered in "any criminal or civil action based in
whole or in part on conduct within the scope of' an exempted joint ven-
ture. 7' Injunctive relief would be available, but only for conduct
"outside the scope" of the exempted activity.1 72 Thus, exempted joint
ventures would have broad protection, even for the harmful results of
criminal conduct that at least partly originates in the exempted activity.
Once exemption is given, a party injured by an exempted joint venture's
conduct would be forced to obtain the permission of the Secretary of
Commerce to institute an action seeking legal relief.173 Given this broad
protection, one would expect the proposed process of obtaining an ex-
emption to be rigorous, but it is not.
Jorde and Teece's proposed ninety day time period in which a fed-
eral agency would either exempt or deny exemption to a joint venture is
not based on the European experience. The European Commission has
found that adequate investigation can take more than three years. 74
Even the shortened opposition procedure for small joint ventures takes
six months.'75 Additionally, the "substantial evidence" standard for ju-
dicial review means that even an extremely flawed exemption based
solely on information provided by the self-interested parties would be
virtually unchallengeable.176
The standards for granting exemption clearly favor exemption. Any
joint venture that does not have "substantial market power" in a relevant
market would be allowed an exemption, regardless of the contractual
terms of the joint venture. 177 In contrast to the European Commission's
empirically-based "white list" and "black list" approach, Jorde and
Teece's disregard of the potentially anticompetitive features of some joint
venture agreements has no experiential basis. 178 Jorde and Teece simply
this context, the standard vests nearly conclusive authority in the administrative agency that
makes the first determination. Only a record virtually devoid of support for the agency's con-
clusion will warrant a reversal.
170. Id. at 107.
171. Id. at 102.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 102-03.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 98-121, discussing the WANO Schnwrtzpulver case.
175. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 15, at 388.
176. The substantial evidence standard is outlined supra note 169.
177. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 96.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 45-56, 61-80, discussing the European block ex-
emption procedure, which is based on the Commission's empirical conclusions about certain
features of particular types of joint ventures.
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assume that "small" joint ventures are pro-competitive. However, there
is no basis in European practice or experience to support this assump-
tion.179 Further, empirical economic studies suggest that this assump-
tion is unfounded.1 80
Under the Jorde and Teece proposal, "substantial power" is defined
in such a way as to make very large joint ventures look small. Their
approach would allow joint ventures where the Reagan Administration
would have blocked a merger.1 " If the relevant market included four
other firms merely capable, either alone or in cooperation, of competing
with the proposed joint venture, the market would be deemed unconcen-
trated enough to allow the joint venture.
The larger the market, the "smaller" the joint venture appears.
Thus, Jorde and Teece define the relevant market to include all firms in
the world which "could economically" make and sell the product in re-
sponse to the joint venture monopolist's rise in price. 182 Such a market
definition is extremely broad: How many firms in the world could feasi-
bly make cars? microchips? nuclear submarines? How would one answer
such questions in ninety days? Clearly, almost every market defined this
way has at least four firms worldwide that are capable of competing with
the joint venture should they so choose. For example, the Jorde and
Teece proposal and definition of relevant market, Ford and GM would
179. The European "safe harbor" approach is a rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive
determination. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
180. See Mueller, supra note 125, at 1272-1310.
181. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 97. The proposal defines substantial power the same
way the Department of Justice defined a "highly concentrated" market for merger purposes.
Cf UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES
FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS §§ 3.31, 3.32 (1988), reproduced in Trade Reg. Rep.
13,109. This standard is continued in the 1992 Merger Guidelines. UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1.5 (Apr. 2, 1992).
Jorde and Teece argue that joint ventures should be subject to less scrutiny than mergers
because they are "less integrative and less permanent (and thus less potentially anticompeti-
tive) than full fledged mergers." Jorde and Teece, supra note 140, at 64-65. See also, Abbott,
supra note 126, at 719. This assumption is not grounded in any European experience, which
treats joint ventures more stringently than mergers, not less. See supra text accompanying
notes 37-44 (concerning "concentrative" joint ventures). In addition, its logical basis is qucs-
tionable. One of the biggest dangers of joint ventures is precisely that it is difficult to assess
just how they might facilitate anticompetitive conduct between large conglomerate parents
operating in related markets. See Eisen, supra note 139, at 262; discussion of WANO
Schwartzpulver, supra text accompanying notes 98-121.
182. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 66, 90, 97. This is the definition Jorde and Tcece
use for the relevant market for a joint venture which includes commercialization, For a joint
venture limited to R&D, Jorde and Teece advocate a relevant market of general know-how,
further enlarging the market. Id. at 65-66.
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be allowed to jointly market and price all their full-sized cars because
Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, and Volkswagen could compete with them if
they chose to enter the full-sized market. Again, European experience
does not support this definition. In Europe, a relevant market is defined
in terms of firms currently making products viewed by consumers as
equivalent, not in terms of the possible industrial capabilities of the entire
world. 183
By artificially expanding the relevant market, the Jorde and Teece
proposal neglects a core value of European antitrust: that consumers
should get a fair share of any efficiencies resulting from a joint venture.
The artificial expansion of the relevant market means that joint ventures
subject to competition on paper will actually be under "negligible com-
petitive pressure to pass on... any savings" to the consumer.'" Addi-
tionally, there is no burden of showing that efficiencies of scale actually
exist if a joint venture falls in this artificially large group of "small"' 85
joint ventures. This, too, is not supported by European practice. Be-
cause the Jorde and Teece relevant market is much larger than that used
in Europe, many of the joint ventures that Jorde and Teece would label
as "small" would have to undergo the more stringent individual exemp-
tion process outlined in WANO Schwartzpulver if evaluated in Europe.
The European procedure requires demonstrated economies of scale
before considering whether consumers are getting their share of those
efficiencies.
186
Another flaw of the Jorde and Teece proposal is the political nature
of the proposed American exemption process. At present, the President
may block government action on antitrust through his control of the At-
torney General. Under the Jorde and Teece proposal, an executive ap-
pointee (the Secretary of Commerce) would also decide whether or not
183. See Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 62, art. 3, par. 2-3. When European
firms want to form a joint venture for research on and development of a new generation of
"widgets," their market share is determined by their combined production of the present gen-
eration of widgets, not their market share of all know-how possibly related to widgets. To
allow the latter approach, as Jorde and Teece advocate, would mean that even a joint venture
for R&D between the only two widget producers in the whole world could be allowed, under
the twenty percent market share limit, so long as the joint venture performed less than twenty
percent of all R&D performed world-wide which could be relevant to developing widgets. See
Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 65 (proposing that the relevant market be that for general
know-how, instead of for R&D specifically directed at improving the products or processes in
question).
184. Commission Decision in re WANO Schwartzpulver, supra note 54, at 111(4).
185. "Small" refers to those joint ventures which would come within the Jorde and Teece
"safe harbor" provision of 20-25% of an artificially inflated relevant market.
186. Commission Decision in re WANO Schwartzpulver, supra note 54, at 111(4).
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private plaintiffs may use the courts. This would counteract the long-
standing Congressional determination, embodied in the Clayton Act,
that private lawsuits are an important supplement to (often sluggish) ex-
ecutive action in deterring antitrust violations.18 7 The political nature of
American antitrust enforcement is not part of the European experience.
The European Commission is not tied to any particular political party or
national executive.
1 88
The practical effect of the Jorde and Teece definitions of "substantial
power" and "relevant market," the lack of "white" and "black" lists, and
the political nature of the exemption process mean that nearly every joint
venture that applied for this broad exemption would receive it from a
sympathetic administration. This practice could not be justified by some
need to "align U.S. antitrust policy ... to antitrust policy in Europe."' 89
Instead, it would demonstrate a basic hostility to the antitrust laws in
general, an attitude further reflected in the proposal's treatment of non-
certified horizontal restraints.
2. Horizontal Restraints
Jorde and Teece propose to lighten the antitrust standards for all
horizontal restraints, including those joint ventures that cannot meet
even the generous Jorde and Teece criteria for exemption. They advo-
cate the lessening of legal checks on horizontal restraints without any
review or control of the type of restraint, the size of the venture, or the
social desirability of the joint venture. Because the Jorde and Teece pro-
posal would make it virtually impossible for private plaintiffs to chal-
lenge horizontal restraints harming them, the proposal departs entirely
from the European approach, which involves careful oversight (albeit by
the Commission instead of through private lawsuits) of the types of joint
ventures subject to exemption and of the exempted joint venture's subse-
quent behavior.
The most objectionable features of the Jorde and Teece proposed
modification of the antitrust laws are the high prima facie hurdles a
plaintiff would have to leap just to survive a summary judgement, the
elimination of any damages for antitrust violations, and the provisions
shifting attorney's fees. 9 '
To survive a motion for summary judgement, Jorde and Teece
187. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15-16.
188. See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 9. Any exhibition of nationalist partisanship may
result in removal from office. Id.
189. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 2.
190. Id. at 62-63.
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would require a plaintiff to show either "substantial market power" in
"any relevant market," 191 as expansively defined in their exemption pro-
posal described above, or "actual anticompetitive harm."' 92 They advo-
cate that the federal judiciary could and should implement this change
without Congressional authorization. 19 Unfortunately, the practical re-
sult would be that only the most patently anticompetitive, probably crim-
inal, restraints would be assailable. To compensate for this effect, the
alternative prospect of proving actual damages at the summary judge-
ment stage is offered. However, as Jorde and Teece themselves suc-
cinctly observe: "we believe this would be a very difficult approach to
pursue."' 94 Tools such as motions for summary judgement "present
dangers of abuse far greater in... complex litigation" on such issues as
"antitrust or securities."' 9 The Supreme Court has observed that in
"antitrust litigation where ... the proof is largely in the hands of the
alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot... [t]rial by
affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury.'" 96 To include the burden of
establishing actual damages as part of a prima facie case renders that
remark even more ominous. Further disincentives for harmed plaintiffs
who seek relief are found in Jorde and Teece's proposed elimination of
damages and in their proposed fee shifting provisions. Even if a plaintiff
can establish actual harm, after risking the costs and fees necessary to
both prosecute and defend, the only remedy available would be an in-
junction. All the monopoly rent and all the social cost appropriated by
the defendant would remain with the defendant. There is simply no dis-
incentive to monopolize under the Jorde and Teece proposal.
The basic rationale for the Jorde and Teece proposal is that
"whatever [oss to competitors and consumers that] comes about from
the pricing of [a joint venture's products] above marginal cost should be
viewed as the unavoidable social cost.., of innovation." 1 97 Such ration-
ale merely invites firms to overcharge consumers and monopolize mar-
kets. Jorde and Teece would eliminate both the active governmental
supervision found in European law, and the threat of paying damages to
injured consumers and competitors found in the U.S. law. Rational,
191. Id.
192. Id. at 66.
193. Id. at 62.
194. Id. at 66.
195. MARCUS ET. AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE - A MODERN APPROACH 410 (1989) (quoting
American College of Trial Lawyers, Recommendations on Major Issues Affecting Complex Liti-
gation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 209 (1981)).
196. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
197. Abbott, supra note 126, at 721 (emphasis added).
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profit maximizing firms will respond to this incentive by acting in ways
that antitrust law is supposed to prevent. Jorde and Teece would strip
away the checks on unbridled economic power found in U.S. law and
replace them with a mere shadow of European law's controls. They as-
sume the harm to genuinely wronged plaintiffs will be outweighed by an
increase in welfare generated through joint venture innovation. Even as-
suming what both the Europeans and empirical studies have rejected,
that all joint ventures result in an increase in efficiencies, why should
individual antitrust plaintiffs bear the cost of increased efficiencies that
supposedly accrue to society in general? Jorde and Teece do not provide
an answer.
V. PROPOSAL FOR AMERICAN ANTITRUST
MODIFICATIONS
The Jorde and Teece proposal demonstrates the danger in trying to
graft one legal culture onto another. One is reminded of the reported
effect in India of the nineteenth century introduction of the English "dy-
ing declaration" rule of evidence: "I have heard that in the Punjab the
effect of [the rule] is that a person mortally wounded frequently makes a
statement bringing all his hereditary enemies on the scene at the time of
his receiving his wound, thus using his last opportunity to do them an
injury." 198'-
Americans tend to dislike government oversight. In an attempt to
gain the benefits of the European system, there is a temptation to take
what we like, such as a more clearly enunciated policy on joint ventures,
and leave what we don't, such as the increased government intrusion nec-
essary for its operation. The result could be just as perverse as the nine-
teenth century Indian twist on dying declarations. Faced with a new set
of rules, American firms will respond to the incentive and monopolize.
In the United States we rely on individual initiative to enforce the
antitrust laws through private attorneys general pursuing civil lawsuits.
The problems and risks in identifying and prosecuting an antitrust de-
fendant are deemed so great that prevailing plaintiffs, in ordinary situa-
tions, are permitted treble damages plus attorneys' fees. We cannot
eliminate the disincentives to monopolize provided by civil damages
without providing another check. To properly implement the European
system of total exemption would require an extensive, balanced appraisal
of how to apply it fairly in the United States, in addition to the expendi-
198. KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 131 (7th ed. 1992) (quoting
SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883)).
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ture of political capital required to sell the idea of more federal bureau-
cracy. Jorde and Teece do not propose a systematic review of American
industrial policy, but merely a quick jolt of incentive to would-be Ameri-
can monopolists.
Moreover, there is no real evidence that we must scrap our present
framework. Jorde and Teece present no evidence that antitrust is the
source of the United States' competitive woes. As Rep. Mike Synar (D-
OK) of the House Judiciary Committee pointed out, "there is no evi-
dence that the ... decline in the competitiveness of American business
can be traced to the antitrust laws." '1 99 If antitrust law is not the culprit,
and the reason American businesses cannot compete is that they pay a
high price for investment capital, or our labor force is poorly educated,
then "'competitiveness' [legislation] should focus on deficit reduction,
lowering interest rates, [education reform,] and labor reform, not anti-
trust reform." 2" Indeed, Jorde and Teece present no evidence that joint
ventures are not formed because of "fear of antitrust."2 ° In fact, the
alleged need for extensive reform is supported only by references to a
Yale survey of corporate R&D managers asking for their impressions
about the effectiveness of the patent laws.2 °2 Jorde and Teece argue that
if corporate managers do not think the patent laws work, and that anti-
trust prevents them from enforcing contractual protection of innovation,
then the U.S. should eliminate the antitrust laws to encourage innova-
tion.203 This speculative reed is too slim to support the kind of massive
change that Jorde and Teece propose. It is ironic that these scholars,
who would hold antitrust plaintiffs to such high standards of proof, pro-
pose to eliminate those plaintiffs' rights on such meager data.
Congress should, however, take some steps to clarify the status of
joint ventures under United States law. Because the Timken/Sealy/
Topco line of cases has never been explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court, there is some valid confusion about exactly what kind of horizon-
tal restraints are per se violations of the Sherman Act.20' This confusion
should be clarified legislatively to avoid the kind of judicial innovation in
which Judges Bork and Easterbrook have engaged when they essentially
199. Eisen, supra note 139, at 258.
200. Id at 257.
201. Id. at 258.
202. Jorde & Teece, supra note 140, at 6 n.7.
203. Id. at 4-12.
204. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See the
discussion of the Sherman Act's application to joint ventures supra text accompanying notes
127-55.
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created a safe harbor for small joint ventures regardless of their potential
anticompetitive effects.2z 5
Through the relatively simple measure of codifying the Addyston
Pipe standard as it applies to joint ventures, Congress can ensure that
naked price-fixing agreements or market allocation agreements, i.e.,
agreements that can have no other object or effect but to raise prices or
restrict output, will always be treated as illegal per se, while "ancillary"
restraints, i.e., those "incident to the main purpose of a union.., useful
to the community" will only be subject to the rule of reason analysis. 20 6
The legislation should affirm that, under the rule of reason analysis, any
term in an agreement not necessary to achieve the socially useful purpose
of a union is an illegal restraint of trade. Further, it should be legisla-
tively affirmed that the rule of reason requires a balancing of the "an-
ticompetitive evils of the challenged practice . . . against its
procompetitive virtues," regardless of market share.207 Past experience
in both the United States and Europe demonstrates that some types of
joint ventures will have anticompetitive effects even if they have small
market shares.
Additionally, as a ten year experiment, the NCRA should be ex-
tended to joint production ventures as well as to joint R&D efforts, but
not to joint marketing agreements. Because "[t]he treble damages provi-
sion [for lawsuits against firms not registered under the NCRA] gives
plaintiffs an incentive to ferret out anticompetitive conduct,"208 and be-
cause the published registration requirement under the NCRA "makes it
public knowledge" that the registrants will engage in joint production,20 9
a private plaintiff's cost of retrieving information about the possibly ille-
gal acts of a registered joint venture will be lowered. Given this targeting
provision anticompetitive conduct is easier to find.2 O Thus, what the
plaintiff gives up in treble damages because of the NCRA registration
requirement, he or she gets back in information, and still recovers single
damages and attorney's fees if he or she can prove harm.
205. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 230 n,1 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Judge Bork finding a "new per se rule of legality" for small joint ventures); Polk
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Judge Easterbrook:
preliminary finding of market power necessary to condemn all but "naked" restraints under
rule of reason standard).
206. Id. (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel, 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898),
affld, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
207. Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
208. Eisen, supra note 139, at 267. For a discussion of the NCRA and its detrebling provi-
sions see supra text accompanying notes 153-160.
209. Eisen, supra note 139, at 267.
210. Id.
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The temporary, experimental nature of this proposed revision is
warranted for two reasons. The first is prudential: the law's temporary
nature will force an assessment of its function, and provide a natural
opportunity for modification based on experience, as opposed to pure
theory. The second reason, based on the European experience, is expedi-
ency: because the European block exemption regulations are temporary,
there is no reason to adopt a permanent change. By observing how Eu-
rope updates its regulations, we can create a starting point for discussion
about the future of the NCRA.
The NCRA should not be extended to price-fixing, market division,
or joint marketing agreements. Firms who fix prices or divide markets
should remain subject to criminal penalties and liable for treble damages.
The prevention of these activities has been an "historic focus" of the
United States antitrust laws for the simple reason that "[p]ricing and
marketing decisions made without the spur of competition would leave
consumers worse off."2  Nor does the European experience provide
support for extending the NCRA to joint marketing. Under the EEC
regulations, joint marketing agreements are disfavored and are almost
per se disallowed.212
By ensuring that the rule of reason is properly applied to all joint
ventures, clarifying when to apply it, and enacting an experimental sys-
tem for registering production joint ventures, the U.S. can responsibly
move toward the goal of encouraging truly efficient joint ventures while
informing firms that if the "efficiency" in their joint venture contract is
really monopoly rent, then the sum must be returned.213 Joint ventures
who share their efficiencies with society will be encouraged and monopo-
lists will not. This is the proper goal of antitrust law in this field.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the European system, joint ventures are restrained from
harming consumers by an exemption process that relies on empirical
findings and factual showings that consumers will receive a fair share of a
211. Id. at 265.
212. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 15, at 185-89, 231.
213. Some may object that a firm must still count the cost of litigation to prove it is efficient
in its decision, thereby discouraging efficient joint ventures whose surpluses are less than the
value of their projected litigation costs. But, without triple damages there is little reason to file
a lawsuit unless one has been actually damaged by the firm's conduct. The residual risk to a
defendant of defending an erroneous lawsuit is balanced by the plaintiffs uncertainty in litiga-
tion, which still exists despite being lessened by the registration procedure. Further, aside
from a strong governmental role, the litigation cost is the lowest price society can pay to have a
competitive marketplace with all of its attendant benefits.
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joint venture's efficiency, coupled with extensive government oversight
into the joint venture's operation.
By failing to acknowledge the government supervision necessary to
implement it fairly, the Jorde and Teece proposal for American antitrust
revision incorrectly purports to mimic the European model. The Jorde
and Teece proposal would effectively eliminate the U.S. system of con-
trolling monopolization through private lawsuits without truly imple-
menting the European system of controlling monopolization through
serious governmental evaluation and supervision. Their proposal leaves
little protection against genuinely anticompetitive conduct by joint
ventures.
All antitrust enforcement mechanisms cost money. Americans have
an historic dislike of government, while the Europeans do not. The
Europeans pay their governments to control monopolists; Americans pay
their lawyers. Jorde and Teece present false alternatives: to have anti-
trust laws or to pay monopolists. Study of the European system that
Jorde and Teece claim to admire reveals that the real choice is between
paying the government or paying the lawyers.
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